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During the week of October 16, 2005, Tennessee Governor Phillip Bredesen (D) headed an ocial
trip to Japan. In addition to the governor, the delegation included other public ocials and
more than 50 representatives of private rms. The stated goal of the mission was to \...[use]
this experience to create new opportunities for Tennessee businesses and workers as we make our
presentation to the international community" (Bredesen to Conduct Asian Trade Mission 2005). 1
This is not the rst time a Tennessee governor traveled to Japan with the claim of state export
promotion. During the ten year interval from 1997{2006, Gov. Bredesen and his predecessor Gov.
Don Sundquist (R) undertook ve trade missions to Japan (in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2003, and 2005).
During that time, Japan was Tennessee's third largest export destination, behind Canada and
Mexico.
Trade missions such as Tennessee's are a potential form of public investment to increase exports
and enhance development. Unlike public investment, a large literature exists on private investment.
Roberts and Tybout (1997) nd evidence of signicant xed costs for rms to enter a foreign market.
Rauch (1999) and Andersson (2007) nd these xed costs are market specic, and depend on the
familiarity of the source country with the destination. Melitz (2003) uses these xed costs in a
theory of private investment where monopolistic competitors, diering in productivity, choose to
pay the xed cost and export, or not. Arkolakis (2008) constructs a model where rms must invest
in advertisements to build market awareness of their products. Firms choose how much to advertise
and whether or not to export to each country.
For many rms, the entry xed cost is enough to prohibit exporting. Bernard and Jensen (1995)
report only 10% of U.S. rms export to any destination. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) nd,
of the rms that do exports, many export to only a few countries. Thus there may be a role
for government, interested in promoting exports, to reduce a market specic xed cost to export,
and increase the access of domestic rms to consumers they otherwise are unable to reach. This
may be done directly by the government subsidizing individual rms or industries. Trade missions,
however, are potentially able to decrease the entry cost for all rms in the state by increasing the
1http://www.tennesseeanytime.org/governor/viewArticleContent.do?id=645 (accessed Nov. 6 2007).
1familiarity of the target country.
Governor-led trade missions are one piece of the state export promotion repertoire. Other tools
include trade oces, translators and professionals specializing in a specic region, and missions
led by other ocials such as commerce chairs. Unlike some of these other export promotion ex-
penditures, governor-led trade missions are easily observable and cleanly measurable. I create a
data set of every governor-led trade mission from each U.S. state by searching through local media
reports during the ten year period from 1997{2006. Further, I know the target country of each
trade mission. There is a high level of activity: more than ve hundred such missions. Nearly
twenty states go on at least one trade mission per year. Furthermore, as the example of Tennessee
and Japan shows, many missions are repeat trips.
Besides the trade mission data, I obtain data on state exports to each country in the world.
This is the only state export data with destination information available. Together with the trade
mission data, I know both how much each state exports to each country and how much public
investment there is in the target country in terms of governor-led trade missions.
I develop a model of the cross-sectional relationship between state exports and state trade
missions, tying theory to the data. The model is an extension of the Melitz (2003) model of trade
as modied by Chaney (2008). The Melitz model features monopolistic competitors, diering by
productivity, that export by paying both a variable cost and a market specic entry cost. Because of
this export xed cost, only highly productive rms export. Chaney's extension allows for asymmetry
across many countries.
I introduce a new agent, the state government, to Chaney's model. The state government is the
only agent with access to a costly technology, trade missions, that decreases the eective xed cost
of exporting to the visited country for all rms in that state. I dene and solve for an equilibrium
where government chooses the optimal frequency of trade missions to each country. The model
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity for individual states and individual countries. This controls
for the possibility the governor of Tennessee may want to visit Japan because Japan is a large
economy or because Japan is an interesting place to visit. The model predicts a strong relationship
between trade missions and state exports for state-country pairs that have a relatively large export
relationship. The economics is similar to that of a sales representative visiting existing customers
2to increase sales further.
From the derived structural equation relating trade missions to state exports, I estimate the
export elasticity of missions using the trade mission and export data I collected. I compare the
estimated export elasticity from the data to a null hypothesis where trade missions are trips to
random destinations. Rejecting this random hypothesis is a necessary, but not sucient, condition
for trade missions to have a positive impact on exports.
As both the trade mission and state export data have source and destination information, I am
able to control for individual state and individual country characteristics. I nd there is a signicant
relationship between state exports and state missions. Governors travel to destinations with whom
they have a large export relationship relative to other destinations. Thus I reject the random model.
This nding holds up under several dierent regression specications and estimators.
Previous literature on export promotion as potential public investment focuses on estimating
the impact of a trade mission on exports using dierences in panel data. Wilkinson, Keillor, and
d'Amico (2005) nd a positive impact on state expenditures promoting exports whereas Bernard
and Jensen (2004) do not. Neither of these papers have destination information for exports or
export promotion. They compare the dierence in total state expenditure on export promotion
against the dierence in total state exports. Besides the limitation of not knowing which countries
are targeted for export promotion, they do not have a particularly clean measure of state promotion
expenditures.
Nitsch (2007) and Head and Ries (forthcoming) study the impact of national trade missions on
national exports. They both use national export and trade mission data with destination informa-
tion. They estimate the impact of trade missions led by country leaders on exports by dierencing
source-target pairs across time using panel data. Again there are con
icting results. 2 Cassey (2007)
estimates the impact of a governor-led trade mission on state exports. Initial estimates indicate
a signicant increase in state exports from a state trade mission. However, accounting for the
potential simultaneity bias in exports and missions, he is unable to reject the hypothesis that state
2Rose (2007) uses the location of embassies and national trade data to nd if the presence of an embassy increases
national exports. He nds an embassy increases exports by 6%{10%. Kehoe and Ruhl (2004) suggest the large
relative increase in Wisconsin exports to Mexico after NAFTA compared to Minnesota is due to the presence of a
Wisconsin trade oce in Mexico.
3trade missions do not have an impact on state exports to the visited country on average.
The con
icting results from the literature are due to features of the panel data they use. First,
on the state level, the large amount of noise in the export data may overwhelm a reasonably
sized eect in state exports from a trade mission; the imprecision of the estimates may hide a
signicant impact. Second, the timing of the treatment is dicult to pin down because missions
occur frequently, as in the case of Tennessee and Japan. The lag time for its eects is unknown.
Most importantly, the literature does not have an explicit theory for how missions aect exports.
The potential endogeneity of missions and exports does not allow for a suitable exogenous treatment.
Thus estimation of the average impact of a trade mission on exports to the visited country using
panel data dierences has not yielded a convincing estimate.
2 A Model of State Exports with Trade Missions
2.1 The Melitz-Chaney Model of International Trade
Consider the model described in Chaney (2008). This model features asymmetric countries diering
in market specic entry costs. Chaney expands the model introduced by Melitz (2003) in which
monopolistic competitors, diering in productivity, decide whether to export or not. 3 The model is
cross-sectional and there is neither aggregate nor individual uncertainty.
There are J countries diering in endowments of the only resource, labor. The endowment is
denoted as Nj for each country j. Labor is immobile across countries.
Consumers in all countries have identical preferences and may be aggregated into a single
representative with a taste for variety:










where x indicates the quantity consumed, ! is the particular variety, 
j is the set of available
varieties in country j,  2 (0;1) is the income share spent on the set of varieties, and  > 1 is
the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Varieties are assumed to be imperfect substitutes
3Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) describe a similar model.
4for one another. Labor does not reduce utility. The representative consumer in dierent countries
faces a dierent set of available goods, 
j.
Good 0 is produced by a constant returns to scale production function where one unit of
labor makes wj units of good 0, qj(0) = wj(0)lj(0). This good is traded competitively and freely
throughout the world.
Besides production of good 0, in each country there are monopolistic competitors, each pro-
ducing one particular variety !. The measure of monopolistic competitors active in each country
is Lj. This measure of active rms is exogenously given, but is proportional to the aggregate labor
endowment Nj. No two potential competitors anywhere in the world produce the same good !.
Therefore knowing the variety ! pins down the country of production of !. Labor is perfectly
mobile across varieties and good 0 within each country.
Monopolistic competitors dier in the goods they produce as well as their productivity, .
Across and within countries, active rms know their permanent productivity (!), which is the
realization of a random variable  drawn from a Pareto distribution with support [1;1) and
parameter 
:
Pr(  u) = H(u) = 1   u 
: (2)
Let 
 > 0. The parameter 
 indicates the heterogeneity of productivity: larger 
 indicates
rms are more similar since the mass of rms is more tightly packed. The Pareto distribution is a
standard modeling choice because of its analytic simplicity.
Production by rm ! for sale in country j depends on the productivity of rm ! and the labor
it uses to sell to j: qj((!)) = (!)lj((!)).
Any of the varieties may be traded. There is a variable cost to trade given by ij. If ij units
of a variety are shipped from i to j then one unit arrives (Samuelson 1954). Assume jj = 1 for
all j, ij > 1 for all i 6= j, and the triangle inequality holds. The transportation cost need not be
symmetric so it is possible ij 6= ji. There is also a xed cost for rms in i who export to j given
by fij > 0 for i 6= j and fjj = 0. Similar to ij, assume the triangle inequality holds for fij and
symmetry need not hold. The xed cost is paid in units of labor by the exporting rm. These
trade costs are identical for all rms in the same country; they do not depend on the productivity
5of rms.






 qij() + wifij : qij() > 0
0 : qij() = 0
(3)
and prots:
ij() = pij()qij()   cij():
Because costs, production, and prots depend on productivity and not the particular good, one
may switch between describing goods with !, (!), or  as convenience dictates. Therefore,
qj(!) = qj((!)) = qij(), lj(!) = lj((!)) = lij(), pj(!) = pj((!)) = pij(), and
j(!) = j((!)) = ij(). There is no need for a source subscript when the variety ! is known
because each variety is uniquely produced in the world.
As in Chaney (2008), I only consider equilibria in which every country produces good 0 and the
measure of monopolistic competitors is proportionally xed based on the labor force of the country.
Good 0 is set to be the world wide numeraire. Its price is xed to one in every country. Given
p(0) = 1 in every country, the labor productivity of producing good 0 in country j, wj, is the wage
in country j, justifying (3).
Because there is no free entry, monopolistic competitors may receive positive prots. The prots
from all rms in country j, j are redistributed to the consumer in country j. Thus the aggregate
income of country j is Yj = wjNj + j. The only substantive dierence with this model and the
Chaney model is each country retains its own prots. I require each country to retain its own
prots so state government has something to maximize with trade missions.
An equilibrium is the set of available goods in each country, f

jgJ
j=1 and the associated produc-
tivity thresholds for operating there, f^ 
ijgJ







j=1; prices for each variety in each country that are produced






j=1; the wage in each country, fw
jgJ
j=1; aggregate
prots in each country f
jgJ

















j=1; such that the following conditions
6hold.
 Good 0: q










 Given prices, labor endowment, wages, prots, and the set of available goods, the repre-









j and xj(0);xj(!)  0 8! 2 
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j.
 Given wages, transportation and xed costs, and the demand function for its good in each





















= Nj;8j where Ljk is
the measure of country j rms exporting to k.











j determined by Lj and f^ 
ijgJ





With a continuum of varieties, the equilibrium is identical under either Bertrand competition
or Cournot competition. Chaney (2008) proves the existence of this equilibrium for 
 >   1 > 0.
Henceforth, all variables are assumed to be at their equilibrium values and thus the stars are
dropped. Equilibrium properties include the following.




= pij() = 
 1
wiij
 . For some rms,
their productivity is low enough that there does not exist a price such that ij()  0. Therefore
for each (i;j) there exists a threshold productivity, ^ ij such that rms in i with  < ^ ij choose not
to export to j. Among other fundamentals and parameters, this threshold productivity depends
























As fij increases, the threshold productivity is larger. Notice because fii = 0, all Li rms
produce domestically. Using (2), the measure of rms in i exporting to j is Lij = Li
 
1   H(^ ij)

.
7In (4), j is the multilateral resistance term representing country j's remoteness from the rest
















 1   1 > 0. The multilateral resistance term takes into account how the rm hetero-
geneity parameter 
 and the variable and xed cost terms aect the measure of rms selling in
country j, and thus the aggregate price level facing consumers in country j.
Interating the exports from those rms whose productivity is greater than ^ ij obtains the
equilibrium aggregate exports from i to j. This involves solving for qj(!()) = qij() using the
fundamentals of Li, wi, fij, ij, and H():











Aggregate exports from i to j increase in the measure of rms in i, the income in j, and the
diculty in j of receiving exports from all other countries, j. Aggregate exports decrease in the
transportation and xed costs to export.
2.2 Adding Government
Departing from the Melitz-Chaney model, I introduce a new agent in each country called govern-
ment, or alternatively the governor. The government is the sole agent with access to a technology
that, for a cost, decreases the eective xed cost to export for all rms located in that country.
This technology is the trade missions the governor of i takes to j.
The eective xed cost facing all potential exporters in i to j is ij and depends on the untreated
xed cost to export, fij, and the trade mission intensity, mij. For modeling purposes, mij is a real





8If there are zero trade missions then ij = fij. The reduction in the eective xed cost diminishes
in trade mission intensity and has an elasticity of  bmij=(z + mij). Let Mij = z + mij. Therefore
b is the elasticity with respect to Mij. The z parameter is a curvature parameter that may be
thought of as the common mission intensity that has already occurred.
The cost associated with trade missions depends on the source i and the target j. The govern-





The interpretation of di is the opportunity cost of the governor's time. The opportunity cost of
time does not depend on the visited country. The gj represents the cost of organizing each instant
of a mission to j, which is common to all governments visiting j. There is no cost from traveling
on zero missions. 4
The government pays for the trade mission expenditure, Gi, with a proportional labor tax ti.
Before proceeding, let me reinterpret the Melitz-Chaney model for U.S. states. Consider U.S.
states as a subset of the countries in the model. Henceforth they are indexed by i as the source for
both exports and missions. Destinations are countries, not other states. The country index is j.
The equilibrium with government is similar to the Melitz-Chaney equilibrium in section 2.1.
The representative's budget changes to (1   ti)wiNi + i for states, but remains Yj = wjNj + j
for countries. The government in each state maximizes the income of the representative consumer
by choosing a labor tax rate and trade mission intensity to all countries in the world.
Assumption 1. The measure of potential exporters in state i, Li, is exogenously xed proportional
to state size Ni.
Assumption 1 simplies the analysis by preventing a general equilibrium eect of trade missions
on rm entry. In the Melitz (2003) model, the measure of domestic producers is endogenously deter-
mined as the result of a continuum of potential rms paying a xed cost to learn their productivity
4Again, trade missions are investment in a costly technology for decreasing the xed cost to all potential exporters.
It is neither the case that trade missions pay the dierence between fij and ij, or a fraction thereof, for each actual
exporter, nor is it the case the target country receives income from expenditures on fij, ij, or Mij.
9and then deciding to domestically produce or not. Subsequently, domestic rms choose whether to
export or not. With free entry, the expected rm prots, net of the cost to learn their productivity,
is zero. Conditional on producing domestically, rm prots are nonnegative with some strictly
positive. Melitz shows the measure of actual rms is proportional to domestic country size, Nj,
thus justifying the assumption of a xed measure of rms in section 2.1. With the introduction
of government, the expected prots before knowing one's productivity are a function of trade mis-
sions. Thus more rms may choose to enter domestically than without government since they know
government will lower the eective export xed cost to some countries. Assumption 1 prevents this.
Assumption 2. The multilateral resistance term j does not depend on mission intensity.
Assumption 2 keeps the denition of j using fij rather than replacing it with ij. The impli-
cation is missions from state i do not open up country j to potential exporters from another state
k. Together assumptions 1 and 2 appear strong. However they are approximately true in the limit
as the benet and cost of a trade mission go to zero. See appendix A for details.
The following lemma shows the equilibrium relationship between trade missions and state ex-
ports.























 1   1 > 0 and b;z > 0, is increasing in Mij.
This proof, as well as all others, is in appendix A.
Trade missions increase aggregate state i exports to j. The increase in state exports is due
entirely to exports from rms whose productivity is not great enough to cover fij, but is great
enough to pay ij. The exports from rms willing to pay fij do not change if instead these
rms actually pay ij, though their prot increases. Therefore trade missions increase total state
exports entirely through the extensive margin. Furthermore, Mij does not impact Xik; there is no
10diversionary impact of missions. Lemma 1 also says missions are more eective if rms are more
homegenous (
 is large), but less eective if goods are more substitutable ( is large).
Trade missions increase state exports. Lemma 2 says they increase state prot also.


























~ Xij  Mab
ij ;
is increasing in Mij.
Trade missions increase state prots through their eect on exports, though the increase in
prots is less than the increase in exports. The government faces a tradeo: trade missions and
increased state prot versus the expense of higher labor taxes reducing state disposable income.





max(1   ti)wiNi + i(Mi1;:::;MiJ) such that tiwiNi  Gi and ti  0;Mij  z: (6)



























In order for an equilibrium to exist, parameters must satisfy 0 <


 1  1 otherwise equilibrium
prices are not well dened. The parameters must satsify (


 1   1)b < 1 otherwise the marginal
benet of trade missions is greater than the marginal cost as missions tend to innity; no optimal




 1 to be 1.5.
11The theorem says optimal mission intensity inversely depends on the state and country-specic
mission costs, di and gj, and the default diculty in penetrating the foreign country, fij. Op-
timal mission intensity is increasing in the size of the foreign country, and the size of the state.
These fundamentals are summarized by ~ Xij, the state exports in the absence of government action.
Therefore the model predicts a positive relationship between untreated exports and missions.
This result is not obvious. One may have thought trade missions would be most eective
if the target country was not a large export destination without government. Then government
investment would open the country up for exports. On the contrary, optimal mission intensity is
greater for targets where there is a large export relationship in the absence of government. The
economics underlying this result are displayed in gure 1.
Figure 1 displays the pdf for the Pareto distribution (2). Consider the case of a target country
with large threshold productivity, ^ 1. It does not matter if this high threshold is due to small
country size, which aects all states equally, or high transportation costs or high f, which aects
the match between a state-country pair. Since ^ 1 is large, there is a small mass of rms with
productivity greater than ^ 1. A trade mission reduces the eective xed cost and the threshold
productivity to ^ 2. The additional aggregate exports accrue exclusively from the extensive margin:
the exports of new exporters induced by the lower eective xed cost. The extensive margin is
the mass of rms between ^ 1 and ^ 2. There is no change in exports from those with productivity
greater than ^ 1 because in this model, the general equilibrium eects of  are suppressed, and thus
a decrease in the xed cost does not aect exports for a rm with productivity above ^ 1.
Now consider the impact of a mission to another country identical to the rst except for a lower
threshold productivity, ^ 3. There is a much larger export relationship with this second country
without government because there is a larger mass of rms to the right of ^ 3 than ^ 1. A mission
to this country reduces the xed cost and the threshold productivity to ^ 4. Again the additional
state exports are from the extensive margin, the mass of rms between ^ 3 and ^ 4. It is clear from
gure 1 there is a far greater mass of new exports from a mission to the second country compared
to the rst. This eect is greater the larger is 
 because this puts more mass in the left tail at
the expense of the right tail. Though rms with productivity between ^ 1 and ^ 2 each export more
than any rm with productivity between ^ 3 and ^ 4, the dierence in aggregate is more than made
12Figure 1. Economics of the theorem. The graph is the pdf for the Pareto distribution with 
 = 3. The additional
mass of new exporters from a mission decreasing the threshold productivity from ^ 1 to ^ 2 is less than the addi-
tional mass of new exporters from a mission decreasing the threshold productivity from ^ 3 to ^ 4.
up for by the mass of new exporters. Thus optimal missions target countries with a large export
relationship without government.
2.3 A Reduced Form Equation
The theorem relates trade missions to ~ Xij, the aggregate exports in the absence of government.
However there can be no data on ~ Xij because most states do in fact travel on trade missions.
Therefore ~ Xij needs to be replaced with actual exports Xij using lemma 1:





















gj (Mij   z):





ab + logXij   logdi   loggj: (8)
13It is feasible to take the log of ~ Xij because each country has a continuum of varieties and there is
no real valued upper support on the productivity distribution. There is always a mass of exporting
rms Lij = Li
 
1   H(^ ij)

> 0 regardless of the size of ^ ij.
Equation (8) shows the relationship between bilateral state exports and bilateral state trade
missions controlling for state and country characteristics, di and gj. The reduced form equation (8)
predicts the export elasticity of trade missions is one relative to each state-country pair. However
this is with respect to Mij.
The variation in the model comes from the bilateral trade costs ij and fij. Since state and
country characteristics are accounted for by di and gj, the variation in Xij is driven by the quality
of state-country matches in ij and fij. For reasons outside of the model, some state-country pairs
have a good match, and thus there is a large export relationship and a strong motive for sending
trade missions. Other state-country pairs are not a good match. The quality of the match may be
thought of as the relative geography or the relative immigrant history of state-country pairs.
3 A Description of the Data
Equation (8) relates actual state exports to actual state trade missions (plus z) controlling for state
and country characteristics. To see if the estimate for the export elasticity of missions is positive
as it is in (8) requires state level data on trade missions and exports by destination. I compile
the trade missions data by searching through local media sources from all states for 1997{2006.
Appendix B contains the details of the trade mission collecting process. State export data comes
from a data set compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census that is rarely used in the international
trade literature. It is the Origin of Movement (OM) state export data available for purchase from
the World Institute of Strategic Economic Research. Cassey (2009) provides the details for the
collection of the OM data. The OM data are the only state export data with the destination
information available.
14Figure 2. Country RGDP and state trade missions. Mean is the average of real GDP from 1997{2006. Point labels
are the 3-letter ISO country code. Axes are log base 2 scale. Countries receiving zero missions are not included.
3.1 The State Trade Mission Data
During the ten years from 1997 through 2006, there are 512 governor-led U.S. state trade missions.
This is roughly fty-ve trade missions per year. The most missions occurred in 1997 (81) followed
by 1999 (70). The fewest missions occurred in 2001 (29). Each year around 20 states travel on at
least one trade mission. I only consider trade missions to countries with 1997 GDP data available
from the IMF. This reduces the number of missions to 503.
Out of 176 destinations with GDP data, 117 (66.48%) of these never host a trade mission
during the ten year period. The average 1997 GDP of destinations that never host a trade mission
is $12.52 billion whereas it is $713 billion for those that do host a trade mission. Thus there is a
strong relationship between the size of a country and the number of missions it hosts. Figure 2
shows this relationship, where the size of a country is given by the mean of its real GDP over the
1997{2006 period.
The largest destinations not visited are Turkey ($186 billion GDP in 1997), Saudi Arabia ($165
billion), and Iran ($106 billion). The smallest destinations visited are Tonga ($0.18 billion), Laos
($1.76 billion), Senegal ($4.41 billion), and Ghana ($6.88 billion). There are 37 destinations to host
15a trade mission with GDP smaller than Turkey's.
Japan is the most frequent destination for governor-led trade missions. It is visited 67 times
from 1997{2006. Other frequent destinations are China (45), Mexico (39), Germany (37), and
Taiwan (31). Though Japan is the most frequent destination, China holds the record for most trips
in a single year: 11 in 2005. Japan is next with ten in 2005. The most frequent state-country trip
is Virginia to Germany which occurs ve times over the ten years. Also, Tennessee to Japan and
Oregon to Japan occurs ve times.
Visited countries tend to be larger than non-visited countries, however visited countries grow
less quickly. The correlation between 1997 GDP of the destination and the total number of trips
there between 1997 and 2006 is 0.82. Compare this to 0.46 which is the correlation of 1997 GDP
with total exports to the country, or 0.44 which is the correlation between 1997 GDP and the total
number of states exporting to the country pooled across panels. The correlation between the total
number of trips and the average GDP growth rate is -0.10. This is similar to the correlation of the
number of exporting states with the average GDP growth rate.
Virginia took the most trips, visiting foreign destinations 31 times in ten years. Other states
with a large number of trips are Wisconsin (30), Nebraska (23), and Ohio (21). The governors
of Connecticut, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming did not travel to any country on a trade
mission. The average state has 10.08 trade missions from 1997{2006. The most missions per year
is by Wisconsin. In 1997 the governor of Wisconsin, Tommy Thompson, went on 12 trade missions.
The average number of trips per year is 2.4 for states with at least one trade mission during 1997
to 2006.
States with the most missions tend to be slightly larger in terms of their total value of man-
ufacturing shipments (TVS), although, as seen in gure 3, the relationship between size and the
number of missions is not strong. The correlation between the total number of trade missions taken
by states during 1997{2006 and their 1997 TVS is 0.22. It is -0.26 between trips and TVS growth.
The correlation between TVS and missions is much less than the correlation of TVS with either
state exports (0.89) or the number of states exporting (0.78).
Figures 2 and 3 provide a nice overview of the state trade mission data and of which countries
host missions and which states travel frequently. They are incapable of showing any relationship
16Figure 3. State total value of manufacturing shipments and state trade missions. Mean is the average of real TVS
from 1997{2006. Axes are log base 2 scale. Connecticut, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming are not included
since they do not have any missions from 1997{2006.
between exports and missions as predicted by the theorem. Thus I introduce data on state exports
by destination.
3.2 The State Export Data
U.S. state export data (OM) to 242 foreign destinations are available, though not well known to
academic audiences. I use export data from all 50 U.S. states to the 176 countries with 1997 IMF
GDP data, in correspondence with the trade mission data. The data are measured at the port of
exit by compiling forms required of those exporting more than $2500 in a shipment. Cassey (2009)
provides complete details of the OM data, including its collection.
The OM data are the only state export data with destination information. Because the data
are collected before any shipments leave the U.S., the quality of the data does not depend on the
destination country.
Another attractive feature of the OM data is, unlike other Census data sets, there is no Census
suppression to protect individual exporter's identities. There is, however, a low-value threshold of
17$2500. That is, there must be at least one shipment from state i to country j of at least $2500
to be included in the data. On a state scale, this low-value threshold is easily satised. However,
nearly 20% of state-country observations are zero. Given no Census edits and the small low-value
threshold, these zeros re
ect \true" zeros.
I only use state export data from odd-numbered years during 1997{2006. Exports are de
ated
using the annualized Producer Price Index for All industrial commodities less fuel.5
Since the export data are collected at the port of exit rather than in the state of production,
it is possible the OM data do not re
ect state exports for two reasons. First, the OM data include
inland freight costs which may overestimate exports from interior states. Second, the OM data
may underestimate exports from interior states because exports consolidated at a port state are
attributed to the port state. Ignoring the destination information, Cassey (2009) compares the OM
data to a destination-less state export data set based on the Annual Survey of Manufactures. He
nds on average the OM data measure state exports for manufacturing exports relatively accurately,
albeit noisily. There is evidence of consolidation, however, for Florida and Texas. For this reason,
I only use manufacturing state export data in the sections that follow. Agricultural and mining
exports are removed from consideration because the OM state exports are not reliable for state of
origin of production.
Combining the state trade mission and state export data yields one observation where there
is a trade mission to a country with whom the traveling state does not export: in 2000 Vermont
visited Laos. Laos is the only country included that does not have normal trade relations with the
United States for much of the study period. Though arranged in 1997, Congress did not approve
normal trade relations with Laos until 2004.
4 Comparing Model Predictions to Regression Estimates
The theory in section 2 yields a prediction of the export elasticity of missions as given in (8). The
model's elasticity is one. I use the data described in section 3 to estimate the same elasticity in the
5Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?wp. Accessed June 11, 2007.
18data. The regression equation corresponding to (8):
logMij = 0 + 1 logXij + i + j + "ij; (9)
where i is the coecient on a state dummy and j is the coecient on a country dummy. I
assume "ij includes measurement error. The state and country dummies attempt to deal with any
unobserved heterogeneity. Heteroskedasticty is present in the data.
The null hypothesis of trade mission travel to random countries is rejected if estimates for 1
are signicantly dierent from zero. The data must reject the random hypothesis in order for trade
missions to have any hope as eective public investment in export promotion. A rejection of the
null hypothesis indicates trade missions are traveling to countries that make economic sense based
on the model. It does not mean there is a statistically signicant impact of state trade missions on
state exports.
Notice the image in gure 2 can be reproduced by the model. But gure 2 could also be
produced with an alternative model in which governor's choose to visit destinations by throwing
darts at a weighted map of the world. If these visits are just about politics, then governors would
tend to visit locations with large economies (which will also be where the states tend to have large
exports). Therefore it is crucial to dierence out the unobservable individual characteristics that
would attract a politically motivated governor to get at the underlying match between states and
countries.
4.1 Estimation and Results
The model and corresponding regression equation may be thought of as in the long run and requiring
cross-sectional estimation. However the data are longitudinal. To transform the panel data into
a cross section, I treat every year as exactly the same. Thus I sum the number of missions from
state i to country j over the ten year period from 1997 { 2006. I average real state manufacturing
exports from i to j in odd-numbered years over the same period to use for actual exports, Xij.
The averaging over years eliminates most zeros in the export data. There are 176  50 = 8800
observations for trade mission intensity and state exports. Of these, 719 (8.2%) state-country
19pairs are never export partners during 1997{2006. Thus log-linearizing as in (9) loses nonrandom
observations. This potentially introduces selection bias in estimates using the ordinary least squares
estimator (OLS), though the the fact that only 8% are zero suggests this bias will be small if it
exists.
The sets of state and country binary variables in (9) control for unobserved heterogeneity in
individual state and individual country characteristics. Because the model and regression equation
are a long run cross-section, the data is not dierenced over time for each state-country pair. I
deal with issues of causality and simultaneity bias using the state and country binary variables.
Minimizing the simultaneity bias is crucial because nding an instrument is dicult as one may
suspect from the scattered points in gure 3.
Since Mij = z + mij, equation (9) is a nonlinear equation with numerous dummies. I estimate
this in a two step procedure. First I estimate z holding the other coecients xed at one. Then
I plug in the estimated value of z and use the OLS estimator to nd an estimate of 1 and the
coecient for each dummy variables.
Table 1 shows the OLS estimates for 1. The rst column is the estimate for 1 when all 50
states and 176 countries are included. I weight observations by the mean RGDP of the destination
country. This weight diminishes the noise from the many small countries making up a tiny portion
of U.S. manufacturing exports. The standard errors are state-country adjusted. Notice the estimate
on 1 is signicantly dierent from zero.
Because of the potential for bias by dropping only those observations with zero exports, I repeat
the estimation by restricting the number of countries to the 50, 10, and 5 largest in terms of mean
RGDP. All 50 states export to the top 10 countries. 6 The top 10 countries account for 63% of U.S.
manufacturing exports.
In all cases, the estimated elasticity, 1, is signicantly dierent from zero. Given the state and
country dummies, the signicance of 1 indicates governors travel to countries for which they have
a relatively large export relationship compared to all other potential export partners. Because the
sets of binary variables control for size, it is not the case that big states travel or big countries are
6The top countries ranked by mean RGDP are Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, China, Italy, Canada,
Spain, Brazil, and Mexico.
20Table 1. OLS Estimates of Export Elasticity of Missions using 50 States
log(z + mij) = 0 + 1 logXij + i + j + "ij
10 countries 20 countries 50 countries 176 countries
z 0.0243 0.041 0.144 *0.144*
(0.477) (0.255) (0.201) {
1 0.411 0.275 0.102 0.075
(0.1346) (0.0788) (0.0237) (0.0147)
N 500 1000 2484 8081
^ R2 0.439 0.427 0.428 0.430
Notes: Observations are mean RGDP weighted. Standard errors are robust to state-country
pairs. State and country dummy coecients are estimated but not reported.
 indicate signicance at the 99% level.
targeted. Also, the binary variables control for behavior such as the opening up of a destination to
all states uniformly.
Since 1 > 0, I reject the random destinations hypothesis. However, the estimates are signi-
cantly dierent from one also. There are several reasons why the estimates may not be one even if
trade missions are motivated by increasing state income.
First, a drawback of restricting data to manufactures is trade missions from primarily agrarian
states presumably increase agricultural exports not manufacturing exports. Therefore in addition
to the regressions with all 50 states, I estimate (9) without the 16 states with an agriculture and
mining share of GDP above 10%. 7 Table 2 shows these estimates. The 1 estimates increase
somewhat, but so do the standard errors.
Similarly, I estimate 1 without Florida and Texas, the two states Cassey (2009) nds evidence of
manufacturing export consolidation. Removing Florida and Texas does not increase the estimates.
Another reason the OLS estimates on 1 may not be one is, in the model, Mij takes real values.
In the data, Mij is a count. Though I have data on the duration of each mission in days for 85% of
trade missions, the trip duration includes travel time which depends on the location of the target
country. Thus using days instead of the count of missions may bias estimates since mission to Asian
countries are necessarily longer.
7The states in order of most agriculture and mining as a share of GDP are Alaska, Wyoming, North Dakota, New
Mexico, Louisiana, Nevada, Texas, Oklahoma, West Virginia, South Dakota, Hawaii, Nebraska, Idaho, Colorado, and
Kansas.
21Table 2. OLS Estimates of Export Elasticity of Missions using top 34 Manufacturing States
log(z + mij) = 0 + 1 logXij + i + j + "ij
10 countries 20 countries 50 countries 176 countries
z 0.077 0.331 0.366 *0.366*
(0.251) (0.230) (0.192) {
1 0.403 0.164 0.094 0.070
(0.166) (0.0683) (0.044) (0.0361)
N 250 1000 2484 8081
^ R2 0.425 0.424 0.422 0.425
Notes: Observations are mean RGDP weighted. Standard errors are robust to state-country pairs. State
and country dummy coecients are estimated but not reported.
, ,  indicate signicance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels respectively.
Table 3. PPML Estimates of Elasticity of Exports on Missions using all 50 states
z + mij = exp(0 + 1 logXij + i + j) ^ "ij
10 countries 20 countries 50 countries 176 countries
z 0.0243 0.041 0.144 *0.144*
(0.477) (0.255) (0.201) {
1 .281 0.265 0.193 0.182
(.0996) (0.0802) (0.0557) (0.0523)
N 500 1000 2484 8081
Notes: Observations are mean RGDP weighted. Standard errors are state-country
adjusted. State and country dummy coecients are estimates but not reported.
,  indicate signicance at the 99% and 95% levels respectively.
Count data, such as the cumulative number of missions, commonly follows a Poisson distribu-
tion. Because of this, I estimate 1 using a Poisson pseudo-maximum liklihood estimator (PPML).
Besides handling the count data of the trade missions, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) point out
the PPML handles the extreme heteroskedasticity common in international trade data biasing OLS
estimates on log-linearized data (as well as aect the standard errors). Table 3 contains the results
from the PPML.
Similar to table 1, the PPML estimates of 1 are signicantly dierent from zero. The fact the
estimate for 1 obtained through the data is signicant with the binary variables indicates there
is some bilateral relationship between exports and missions beyond individual state and individual
country characteristics. There is evidence states travel on trade missions to those countries with
whom they have a relatively large export relationship. I reject the random hypothesis.
225 Conclusion
U.S. state governors frequently travel abroad on trade missions. The motive for these trade missions,
however, is debatable. Proponents argue they increase state exports to the visited country and state
income, and thus are a form of public investment in development. Detractors argue trade missions
are a vacation for the governor at taxpayer expense. The panel data approach of resolving this
debate by testing for a signicant change in state exports before and after a governor-led trade
mission yields con
icting results. In contrast I take a cross sectional approach testing for a weaker
but necessary condition: whether governors travel to random destinations or whether they travel
to destinations consistent with a model where trade missions matter for state exports.
I nd evidence that trade missions are to destinations for which the state is exporting a relatively
large amount compared to that state's other export relationships. My data allow me to control
for the unobserved heterogeneity in individual state and country characteristics. Therefore my
estimate is of the export elasticity of missions relative to the state-country pair. I reject the
random destination hypothesis.
The model's predicted elasticity is part of the solution of a reduced form equation derived by
adding a benevolent government to the heterogeneous rm monopolistic competition trade model
of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008). I solve this extended model for the equilibrium frequency
of trade missions to each country. I derive a relationship between trade missions and actual state
exports. I create a new data set on governor-led trade missions from 1997{2006 containing the
destination information and combine it with a little used data set of state exports, also with the
destination information. Since I know the source state and target countries for both trade missions
and exports, I control for individual state and individual country characteristics in a regression of
the data.
This paper takes a step toward resolving the debate on whether public investment in targeted
export promotion and customer acquisition leads to increased exports and development. It adds
to the literature by focusing on one particular targeted export promotion policy|governor-led
trade missions|that unlike previous work in which investment is private and inferred, is a mea-
surable form of investment. I develop a theory of public investment commensurate with this public
23investment data.
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Assumptions Li(Mij) = Li Yj(Mij) = Yj j(Mij) = j.
Justication. Suppose governor i may take at most one trade mission to country j. Further
suppose the parameters and fundamentals, Yj, wi, and ij, are such that this governor chooses to
go on the mission. I show this decision will not change to zero missions when both the benet and




ij   ~ Xij = 0 and lim
di!0
digj(Mij   1) = 0:
The notation above matches that in the paper, yet should be viewed generally enough to hold in
form when the assumptions do not hold. Let di and b converge to zero along the same sequence.















Therefore near the limit, the convergence rate is equal. Since the governor chooses to go on a trade
mission initially and the rate of convergence is constant in the limit, the governor does not want to
change her mind at any point in the sequence.
Lemma 1. Equilibrium aggregate exports from i to j as a function of trade missions,





 1   1 > 0 and b > 0, is increasing in Mij.
26Proof. From Chaney, aggregate state i exports to country j are given by (5),




















rst derivative shows state exports are increasing in missions:
dXij
dMij
= ab ~ XijMab 1
ij > 0
for a;b > 0 and Mij  1. Since there is no upper bound on the Pareto distribution, ~ Xij > 0; there
is always a mass of rms with productivity greater than the threshold ^ ij.
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provided fij or di and gj are small enough so that Mij  1 8i;j and 0 < ab < 1.
Proof. The consumer and rms problems solved in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008). I show the







ij   digj = 0:







In order for this to hold with 
 >    1 > 0 it must be that ab   1 < 0. The problem is greatly
simplied with the assumptions because then ~ Xij is treated as a constant by the government.
B Trade Mission Data Collection and Sources
Data on trade missions are obtained by the author through a Lexis-Nexis Academic search through
local news sources. The search is state-by-state, covering the years 1997{2006. Keywords in the
search are \governor," \trade," and \mission." For some states, the returns to this search were large
and mainly irrelevant. Thus \governor," \export," and \mission" are used for some large states.
It is common for each trip to include multiple foreign destinations. Each country is counted as
a separate trade mission. Furthermore both Hong Kong and Taiwan are counted as destinations
separate from China. Also if the same destination is visited twice in the same calendar year then
it is counted as two separate trips. The data do not include any visits of foreign delegates in the
United States, any governor trips for reasons not explicitly stated as \trade missions," any trips
in which the governor of the state is not present, or any trips that are organized by the Federal
28Government. Finally there must be a local newspaper reference close to the data of departure for
the trip count. Any reference such as \Unlike the governor of X, the governor of Y traveled to
Japan in 1984" is not counted.
Additional information is the duration of each trade mission in days. These days include travel
time, thus more remote destinations have longer durations than closer destinations even if the time
in each host is the same. Travel time is included because news sources near unanimously report
the time the governor is away from the state rather than the time in each host. Both the taxpayer
cost of the trip and the number of delegates is reported infrequently and inconsistently and thus
are not used.
The reason for using only governor-led trade missions is twofold. The governor is an important
enough gure in local, if not national media, that the press makes a record of the trade mission. This
allows me to compile a list of all trade missions using a standardized source, LexisNexis academic.
Also, trade missions vary in importance. The governor provides a signal of the importance of the
mission. As one trade mission participant said, \We will be viewed as serious people because our
governor is supporting us..." (Doyle Goes to China on Businesses' Dime, Madison Capital Times,
March 22, 2004). This is not necessarily the case with other public ocials, such as Lt. Governors,
commerce chairs, and others, who sometimes lead missions.
Trade missions do not directly cost the taxpayer much. Some of the trade mission observations
include data on direct public expenditure on the trade mission. Typically the state pays for the
governor and a few other ocials, but private delegates pay for themselves. It is not rare for a
growth promotion organization to sponsor public ocials, thus no taxes are used. Out of 183
missions for which the public expense is reported in the media, 38 (20.76%) were fully paid for
privately. The average total public outlay for trips using public money is $47,500. The most
expensive trip recorded cost is $250,000 (North Carolina to China in 1998), a tiny fraction of any
state's budget. The most signicant cost is the time the governor is not in the state, an aspect
I model. It is this opportunity cost that is most important in the trade mission debate. I model
this explicitly. Though the costs of a trade mission are relatively small, the question of its eect is
still important for guiding state policy and for settling a matter of public debate. If in fact trade
missions do increase state exports, then their low cost is one of their most attractive characteristics.
29